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STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920619-CA 
i r, 
BROOKS., : ' Priority No. 2 
De fendant/Appe11ant : 
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STATEMENT Of iSSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS Or K^.--« 
3 Oid the r* < jriectlv find Officer 
hendri-Ki - ? 
A * r i a - * " . 11 d i n y -•-*.•».,* i a * - - . ^  ^  ^ . ne 
of fac4 - • ' f^ -v-.-*, . -*- , *
 fiav;v ia r r o n e 0 j. 
State v. Menaozc _a_ Syjces, 
840 P. 2d 825, 826 and at 837 38 (Jackson J concurring) (Utah 
Api;: ] 9: Bui see State v . Munseii o^x r\ 2d ] 3 3 4-15 (Utah 
App 19 9 2 ) (a /]::: p lying nonde £ e r en t i a 1, " cor re c t i on o f e r ror 
"standard in reversing trial court's reasonable suspicion 
determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). Compare 
State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 484-86 (Utah App. 1993) (Bench, 
J., concurring, joined by Jackson, J.) (arguing that Mendozai's 
standard of review has not been altered by State v. Thurman, 84 6 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)), with State v. Potter, No. 920614-CA, slip 
op. at 3 n.2 (Utah App. October 19, 1993) (stating that Thurman, 
"compels the adoption of a bifurcated approach where we review 
the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion for error."). 
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or the appellate court 
reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the trial court was 
mistaken. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Was the stop valid even if the police officer acted 
outside of his jurisdiction? 
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate 
review. State v. Brown, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah App. 1993) 
(defendant's failure to preserve issue waives right to assert 
challenge on appeal). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with distributing, or 
arranging to distribute, a controlled substance to a minor, a 
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d t I V m y vi . , .... > 
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I i n.il IMIIIIII Hpntenred d e f p n d v t u^ x ' *--*c - - «->•<= :T^ar, c~ a t e 
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! i a n l i d«-j M. d I Hi M i l e n c < : j ! I i i IIIIIII ru i «'i ill i r ' - ' t e n c e 
defendant was then serving (R 1 28) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
d 
"onclusicr.s :r L& + , xurace.v rec::- lit idot- peitinent to this 
"The State also charged defendant with unlawful possession 
u.jg paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
.:: Code Ann, § 58-37a-5 {1:990) and trespassing, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990); 
however, the trial coi irt dismissed these counts before trial (R. 
36) . 
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appeal (R. 142-46) (a complete copy is contained in Addendum B). 
The court's findings are therefore reproduced here, adding 
citations to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to 
suppress and other testimony before the court: 
1. Orem Police officer Kris Hendrickson was 
patroling[sic] near the Lindon Marina on 
March 20, 1992, at approximately 12:50 a.m. 
[Officer Hendrickson patrolled this area 
"every night"] (Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, June 18, 1992, "S.Tr." 4-6). 
2. At that time, Officer Hendrickson 
observed motor vehicle brake lights come on 
in the park area. Officer Hendrickson, 
believing that the park was closed to all 
vehicular traffic, [Officer Hendrickson 
further testified that there was a sign 
indicating "Day Use Only. No Overnight 
Camping" in the area (S.Tr. 15).] immediately 
proceeded by foot into the park area to 
further investigate (S.Tr. 12, 15). [Officer 
Hendrickson also knew there was a vandalism 
problem in the Marina area (S.Tr. 7, 20).] 
3. As he approached the vehicle on foot, 
(S.Tr. 16, 18) he observed what he determined 
to be cigarette lighters flashing on and off 
inside the vehicle (S.Tr. 16-17). Officer 
Hendrickson has substantial experience with 
drug enforcement, and presently heads up the 
Drug Recognition and Enforcement Team through 
the Orem Police Department (S.Tr. 17-18). 
Through his experience, he recognized the 
lighters coming on and off as being 
consistent with someone who is smoking 
marijuana (S.Tr. 17). 
4. As Officer Hendrickson got closer to the 
vehicle, the vehicle began to move out of the 
park area (S.Tr. 19). Curious as to how the 
vehicle had gotten into that location, since 
all entrances to the park were barricaded 
off, he watched to see how the vehicle exited 
(S.Tr. 20). He noticed the vehicle go to the 
far north end of the park and exit through an 
area containing dirt piles and abandoned old 
machinery. 
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Officer Hendrickson immediately returned 
:,o his vehicle, realizing that for the 
suspect vehicle to exit the area, it would 
have to come by his vehicle (S.Tr. 3 9 ) . 
vehicle exited the par k ai ea and 
came around by his vehicle, he pulled the 
e over by activating his overhead 
' I ; ] 9 20) . 
Tne state submitted several exhibits 
\ m. i ch were photographs depicting all known 
entrances to the park and how they were 
marked "closed," All entrances were 
barricaded by either a locked c~*-^ 
solid guardrail (S , T'r 14 -1 s 
8. The defendant accesseu ...it: pcur, by taki 
a road through the Marina area and then 
meandering up through the dirt: mounds and 
-" -i""!"5rvn°^  machinery 'c Tr 14' , 
(R. 144-4 si- Adaendur ?. . 
i if fart, the rouM denied 
defendant's none _„ sjppiess. ~ne Court turth&i detcimmcd: 2 
1 . defendant's motion £•>__ ^^pression, 
the aefendant arrues an inappropriate burden 
upon the Stat- . that the defense claims 
there was a 1-* > :. f probable cause for the 
stof wh- -. ::f .icruai burden upon the State is 
to prove : r.'.' * l ,: r r war " v"^ '-.c-'T.^ h * ~ 
susr ~~~:" 
2. jne officer, in good faith, believed that 
the park was closed to all vehicular traffic, 
regardless of defendant's ability to maneuver 
his vehicle in such a way to make access to 
the park through a roadless open area. Based 
upon the perception of Officer Hendrickson, 
and his belief that the vehicle was 
trespassing the park area, Officer 
Hendrickson did have reasonable suspicior - • 
s t op t he vehic1e, 
2The trial court .labeled these determinat :i :>ris "Conclusions 
of Law" (R, 14 3) , however, with the exceptioi i of number 4, they 
should be seen as additional factual findings. 
3. Furthermore, based on the observations by 
Officer Hendrickson of cigarette lighters 
coming on and off inside the vehicle, and his 
experience and qualifications in the drug 
area, Officer Hendrickson also had reasonable 
suspicion that illegal drug activity was 
going on inside the vehicle, therefor 
justifying his subsequent stop. 
Based on these findings, the court found that Officer 
Hendrickson's stop was justified and denied defendant's motion to 
suppress: 
4. The defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained from the stop and 
subsequent search by Officer Hendrickson of 
the defendant's vehicle is hereby denied. At 
the time the stop was made, Officer 
Hendrickson had reasonable suspicion, if not 
probable cause, to believe that illegal 
activity was presently happening or was about 
to occur; therefore, the stop and subsequent 
search of the defendant's vehicle was 
justified. 
(R. 142-43, see Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Hendrickson reasonably suspected defendant was 
trespassing when he observed defendant's brake lights in a park 
closed to nighttime traffic. Additionally, the officer's 
subsequent observation of flickering cigarette lighters, which he 
knew to be consistent with illegal drug activity, also justified 
the investigatory stop. The trial court correctly considered the 
totality of the circumstances in finding the officer reasonably 
suspected criminal activity. 
Defendant waived this Court's consideration of Officer 
Hendrickson's alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3 (1990) 
by abandoning that issue below. Despite an express invitation at 
6 
the suppression hearing from the trial court to pursue this 
claim, defendant failed to provide the trial court with legal 
authority to support his theory that the stop was invalid due to 
the alleged statutory violation. Defendant's subsequent renewal 
of his motion to suppress at trial ignored this theory. 
Defendant's failures to properly present this issue to the trail 
court precludes appellate review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED OFFICER 
HENDRICKSON HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
DEFENDANT'S TRUCK 
The trial court correctly considered the totality of 
the circumstances in finding that Officer Hendrickson had 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's truck. Defendant fails 
to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous. 
A. Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to the officer and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). See 
also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). 
Accordingly, the reasonable suspicion standard is "less 
demanding" than probable cause, requiring only "'some minimal 
level of objective justification'" for the stop. United States 
7 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations 
omitted). Accord State v. Menke,, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 
1990) (reasonable suspicion "must: be based on objective facts 
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity") (emphasis added). In evaluating the validity of a 
stop based on reasonable suspicion, a court must consider "xthe 
totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture.'" Sokolow 
490 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981)). See also Roth, 827 P.2d at 257. As Sokolow notes: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same -- and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
Ibid, (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 
Under these established principles, a stop based on 
reasonable suspicion may serve not merely to seize criminals, but 
also to dispel suspicion and prevent criminal activity. E.g., 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (limited detentions supported by interest 
in "effective crime prevention and detection"); accord State v. 
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). Consequently, 
there remains the very real chance that many such stops will 
reveal no criminality. That possibility, however, does not 
preclude an officer from investigating facts that would warrant a 
person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 22. See also Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-41 (recognizing a police 
8 
officer's "duty to make observations and investigations to 
determine whether the law is being violated"). 
B. Standard of Review for Reasonable 
Suspicion 
A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion 
is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987); Sykes, 840 P.2d at 826, and at 837-38 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah 
App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction of error" 
standard in reversing trial court's reasonable suspicion 
determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). Compare 
State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 484-86 (Utah App. 1993) (Bench, 
J., concurring, joined by Jackson, J.) (arguing that Mendoza's 
standard of review has not been altered by State v. Thurman, 84 6 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)), with State v. Potter, No. 920614-CA, slip 
op. at 3 n.2 (Utah App. October 19, 1993) (stating that Thurman, 
"compels the adoption of a bifurcated approach where we review 
the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion for error."). 
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or the appellate court 
reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the trial court was 
mistaken. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
C Defendant Fails to Demonstrate The Trial 
Court's Finding of Reasonable Suspicion is 
Clearly Erroneous 
In Point I of his brief, defendant urges this Court to 
hold that "the summation of two circumstances which do not amount 
9 
to a reasonable suspicion individually in order to achieve 
reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances is 
not appropriate." Br. of App. at 4 (emphasis added). This Court 
has expressly rejected attempts to attack each fact individually 
in a reasonable suspicion determination. In State v. Strickling, 
this Court stated: 
Looking at each fact in isolation, as 
defendant does, is not proper. We instead 
rely upon a test that f"consider [s] the 
totality of the circumstances" to determine 
whether the officer had "specific and 
articulable facts" to support suspicion. 
844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Munsen, 821 
P.2d at 15, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21), cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). The trial court correctly applied this 
test. 
Despite the fact that the totality of the circumstances 
governs, either of Officer Hendrickson's observations standing 
alone was sufficient to support an investigatory stop. Certainly 
the two together support the trial court's finding. The 
officer's observation of defendant in an area he believed to be 
closed to nighttime traffic was sufficient to stop for a possible 
trespassing violation. Additionally, the officer observed the 
flickering of several cigarette lighters, an activity he knew was 
consistent with drug use (S.Tr. 17) . The trial court correctly 
found that either would compel a reasonable officer to further 
investigate (R. 143). 
Defendant's argument on appeal that the flickering of 
cigarette lighters may be consistent with innocent activity, Br. 
10 
of App. at 4, ignores Officer Hendrickson's unchallenged 
expertise in drug enforcement. (S.Tr. 17-18, Tr. Aug. 3, 1992 at 
53-54, 63-64, 79-80). As this Court stated in Menke: 
The trained law enforcement officer is in a 
different position than the average citizen 
in that he or she "may be able to perceive 
and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained 
observer. . . . The officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience." 
787 P.2d at 541 (quoting State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88-89 
(Utah App. 1987)). A possible innocent explanation for each fact 
known to Officer Hendrickson does not undermine his articulable 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, or was being 
committed. See, e.g., Strickling. 844 P.2d at 983; State v. 
Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992). 
Because defendant fails to demonstrate clear error in 
the trial court's factual findings and also fails to apply the 
totality of the circumstances test to the facts this Court should 
affirm the trial court's reasonable suspicion determination. See 
State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah App. 1993) (Bench, J. 
concurring, joined by Jackson, J.). Factual findings are not 
clearly erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or the appellate court reaches a "definite and firm 
conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). By ignoring the trial court's 
consideration of the totality of the facts as perceived by the 
officer, defendant fails to demonstrate clear error. 
11 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION 
OF THE JURISDICTION ISSUE BY FAILING TO 
PROVIDE THE TRIAL COURT WITH AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO RULE BELOW 
Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the stop 
was invalid because the officer was allegedly out of his 
jurisdiction. Br. of App. at 5-6. Despite the fact that the 
trial court specifically asked defendant to brief this issue, 
(S.Tr. 49, 51), see Addendum C, the record is devoid of any 
attempt by defendant to provide the trial court with legal 
support for his assertion that the stop was improper for this 
reason. 
Defendant further demonstrated his abandonment of this 
issue at trial. After all the evidence was presented, defendant 
renewed his motion to suppress, but did not reassert the 
jurisdiction issue (Tr. Aug. 4, 1992 at 220-226, 229-30), see 
also Defendant's Motion to Suppress, (R. 26), Addendum A. This 
Court should therefore refuse to consider this issue. See 
Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) ("When there 
is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake to 
consider the issue on appeal.") 
Defendant's abandonment of this issue deprived the 
court of any opportunity to rule on this issue and he has thereby 
waived its consideration on appeal. C.f. State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (absent special justification 
for failing to present all available grounds in support of a 
12 
suppression motion, this Court will not rule on those grounds not 
addressed in the trial court). See also State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991) ("a defendant who fails to bring 
an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it 
initially on appeal").3 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Hendrickson based his stop of defendant's truck 
on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court 
correctly applied the totality of the circumstances test in 
making this finding. 
Defendant waived this Court's consideration of the 
jurisdiction issue by not allowing the trial court to rule on 
this issue. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the trial 
defendant cites State v. Fixel. 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987), 
for the proposition that suppression is the proper remedy because 
Officer Hendrickson was outside his jurisdiction at the time of 
the stop._ Br. of App. at 6-7. However, in Fixel, the Utah 
Supreme Court held, in a case where an undercover officer acted 
outside of his jurisdiction, that: 
suppression of the evidence obtained as a 
result of [the officer's] illegal 
investigation 'would be a remedy out of all 
proportion to the benefits gained to the end 
of obtaining justice while preserving 
individual liberties unimpaired.' 
Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369 (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1992) (suppression not appropriate 
for procedural violation of search warrant statute). Officer 
Hendrickson regularly patrolled the area of the stop and was 
unaware of any jurisdiction problem until the day before the 
suppression hearing. (Tr.l at 5-6, 25-26). If suppression was 
inappropriate in Fixel, it is clearly not mandated here. See 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263-4 (Utah 1993) ("if the 
police had no 'purpose' in engaging in the misconduct . . . 
suppression would have no deterrent value.") 
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court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?7 day of October, 1993 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
CLEVE J. HATCH, UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC, 40 South 100 
West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this^? day of October, 
1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CLEVE J. HATCH (5609) 
Public Defenders Inc. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 374-1212 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN UTAH C0UNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Mil ttxu^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPRESS 
Case No. 
ommzs 
Comes now, Brent R. Brooks, by and through his counsel of record, 
Cleve J. Hatch, Public Defenders Inc. and moves the court to supress 
evidence obtained. 
The motion is based upon the fact that the police officer 
justified the traffic stop on what the defense contends was an 
erroneous determination that Mr. Brooks was committing the offense of 
trespass. The officer had no probable cause to effect a traffic stop. 
The motion is further based on the Memorandum of points and 
authorities filed herewith. 
Therefore the Defense moves the court to supress evidence 
obtained from the erroneous determination, of trespass, there being no 
probable cause to effect an arrest of Mr. Brooks. 
Dated this X day of June, 1992. 
Cleve J. Hatci 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Motion, postage prepaid, to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, 
Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606, this S^A day of June, 
Cleve J.^Stch 
ADDENDUM B 
KAY BRYSON, #0473 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Phone: 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
BRENT RAY BROOKS : Case No, 921400255 
Defendant, : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing, based on 
defendant's Motion to Suppress, on June 18, 1992, before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding. The State was present and was 
represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney John L. Allan. The 
defendant was present and was represented by Cleve Hatch. 
On June 9, 1992, the defendant filed a Motion to Suppress 
contending that the officer lacked probable cause to affect a 
traffic stop which resulted in the arrest and eventual charging of 
the defendant in this case. The motion, on its face, indicated 
that it was accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
However, such Memorandum was never received by the State or by the 
Court. Because the State had never received the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, it had no basis on which to respond. 
The State appeared on June 18, 1992, where the judge 
determined to go ahead with the hearing even though no memorandum 
FE3 4 
«:•-! 55 f ,j 3j 
had been filed in this matter. The State called the arresting 
officer, Kris Hendrickson, who was sworn and testified. The State 
also offered and the Court received several exhibits, consisting of 
photographs of the area in question. Defendant's attorney also had 
an opportunity to cross examine the State's witness. The State 
then closed its portion of the evidence. 
The defense then called Norm Castle and one other witness to 
testify about the boundaries concerning the park. The State had an 
opportunity to examine these witnesses as well. The defense then 
rested and both parties were given an opportunity to make closing 
arguments. The Court received the closing arguments, and having 
been fully advised on the matters herein, hereby makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Orem Police officer Kris Hendrickson was patroling near 
the Lindon Marina on March 20, 1992, at approximately 12:50 a.m.. 
2. At that time, Officer Hendrickson observed motor vehicle 
brake lights come on in the park area. Officer Hendrickson, 
believing that the park was closed to all vehicular traffic, 
immediately proceeded by foot into the park area to further 
investigate. 
3. As he approached the vehicle on foot, he observed what he 
determined to be cigarette lighters flashing on and off inside the 
vehicle. Officer Hendrickson has substantial experience with drug 
enforcement, and presently heads up the Drug Recognition and 
2 
Enforcement Team through the Orem Police Department. Through his 
experience, he recognized the lighters coming on and off as being 
consistent with someone who is smoking marijuana. 
4. As Officer Hendrickson got closer to the vehicle, the 
vehicle began to move out of the park area. Curious as to how the 
vehicle had gotten into that location, since all entrances to the 
park were barricaded off, he watched to see how the vehicle exited. 
He noticed the vehicle go to the far north end of the park and exit 
through an area containing dirt piles and abandoned old machinery. 
5. Officer Hendrickson immediately returned to his vehicle, 
realizing that for the suspect vehicle to exit the area, it would 
have to come by his vehicle. 
6. When the vehicle exited the park area and came around by 
his vehicle, he pulled the vehicle over by activating his overhead 
lights. 
7. The State submitted several exhibits which were 
photographs depicting all known entrances to the park and how they 
were marked "closed." All entrances were barricaded by either a 
locked gate or by a solid guardrail. 
8. The defendant accessed the park by taking a road through 
the Marina area and then meandering up through the dirt mounds and 
abandoned machinery. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. In defendant's motion for suppression, the defendant 
argues an inappropriate burden upon the State in that the defense 
claims there was a lack of probable cause for the stop when the 
actual burden upon the State is to prove that there was a 
reasonable suspicion. 
2. The officer, in good faith, believed that the park was 
closed to all vehicular traffic, regardless of defendant's ability 
to maneuver his vehicle in such a way to make access to the park 
through a roadless open area. Based upon the perceptions of 
Officer Hendrickson, and his belief that the vehicle was 
trespassing the park area, Officer Hendrickson did have reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle. 
3. Furthermore, based on the observations by Officer 
Hendrickson of cigarette lighters coming on and off inside the 
vehicle, and his experience and qualifications in the drug area, 
Officer Hendrickson also had reasonable suspicion that illegal drug 
activity was going on inside the vehicle, therefor justifying his 
subsequent stop. 
4. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
from the stop and subsequent search by Officer Hendrickson of the 
defendant's vehicle is hereby denied. At the time the stop was 
made, Officer Hendrickson had reasonable suspicion, if not probable 
cause, to believe that illegal activity was presently happening or 
was about to occur; therefore, the stop and subsequent search of 
4 
the defendant's vehicle was justified. 
DATED this y daY o f January, 
Cleve Hatch/ Attorney for defendant 
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it's possible access area, and that's the reason that 
fisherman use it all the time. If they knew they 
weren't supposed to be in there, likely not nearly as 
many of them would go. And the route in and out would 
not be so worn and well used. 
I think it's clear that Mr. Brooks — if he 
was in there, he was not trespassing or had no notice 
that there was trespassing by any fence or any signs. 
The statute requires, "To enter or remain unlawfully 
on property belonging to another at a time which 
notice against entry had been given by fencing" — he 
indicates there's no other fencing — "or other 
enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders 
and/or by posting of signs reasonably to come to the 
attention of the intruder." The only sign the officer 
saw anywhere was one clear inside the park. 
THE COURT: Well, as to that argument, I 
can't buy that. The barricades across or at least 
substantially across all of the access areas to that 
park would constitute clear intent of the owner to 
advise you that this area is not to be entered. And 
the fact that people persist and go around the 
barriers and barricades doesn't change that fact. So 
I'm not impressed with that. 
The only issue that I see that has merit, and 
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I don't know if it does, is the argument you've made 
of a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence 
outside his jurisdiction. In the past I have often 
wondered in some of the suppression hearings why we 
were having them because they were misdemeanors 
committed in the presence of the officer for which he 
always has reason to make a stop. Not only that, he 
has a duty to. And, therefore, the stop is obviously 
not of pretext, and you don't need probable cause. 
Probable cause isn't a factor. You have an 
offense committed in the presence of the officer. I 
was glad to see the Supreme Court finally recognize 
that in a recent decision and talk about it. 
But I am concerned and would like some 
direction — do you have any authority to support the 
proposition that a police officer outside his 
jurisdiction cannot make an arrest for a misdemeanor 
committed in his presence? 
MR. HATCH: The information that that was the 
case — I did have some suspicion of that, but that 
didn't come to my knowledge that that was in fact the 
case until yesterday. And I have not had time to see 
what authority there is on that specific issue. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you both need to 
brief that issue for me. I see immediate probable 
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1 cause after the stop is made by the smell of burned 
2 marijuana. And I don't have any problem with that. 
3 But if the stop was inappropriate, then I would feel 
4 to the contrary. 
5 MR. ALLEN: Judge, I would like to see the 
6 case law on that because basically what we're saying, 
7 then, is every officer who's off duty who sees a 
8 person driving erratically on the freeway and makes a 
9 stop of them, we have to throw it out of court because 
10 he's out of his jurisdiction. 
11 THE COURT: I have problem with that, but 
12 that's the argument being made. 
13 MR. ALLEN: I'd be glad to respond to his 
14 brief. If he can find the case law, I'd love to 
15 respond. 
16 MR. HATCH: Well, the officer indicated that 
17 it's their departmental policy to involve Pleasant 
18 Grove before they go forward. 
19 THE COURT: That has to do with a lot of 
20 other things, most of which deals with who's going to 
21 have to bear the expense. And I think that's 
22 principally it. Where you're on a close borderline 
23 between jurisdictions between Lindon City and 
24 Vineyard, and the officer has been patrolling in 
Vineyard and makes a U-turn into this area and out 25 
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again, he may well be out of Vineyard at the moment. 
He's very close to his jurisdiction. And so I need to 
see some authority on that. 
And I think you have the sense of my ruling 
on all the other issues, but that one. And I want to 
see that before I make any ruling. 
MR. HATCH: We'll see what we can find, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: How soon can you do that so we 
can get this accomplished? This case is set for trial 
on about the 9th, isn't it? 
THE CLERK: July 30th. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. So it isn't quite as 
close as I thought it was. 
MR. HATCH: I don't know how much trouble I'm 
going to have or not. I'd like to have ten days in 
case I need it. 
THE COURT: I don't have any problem since we 
have that long until trial. Today is the 18th. Do 
you want until the 30th? 
MR. HATCH: Yes. 
the 30th. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll give you until 
• 
And when would you like to respond? 
MR. ALLEN: Judge, perceiving what I believe 
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he will find, my response shouldn't take very 
all. In fact, there 
in fact, 
working 
may not need to be any. 
long at 
But if, 
he does find case law, if I could have five 
days. 
THE COURT: All 
the State Bar Convention 
So is that okay? 
until 5: 
there's 
MR. 
THE 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
right. I'll be gone 
until Monday the 6th, 
That's fine, Judge. 
All 
00 on the 6th to 
MR. 
THE 
HATCH: 
COURT: 
nothing else 
MR. ALLEN: 
the exhibits? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
withdrawn. 
COURT: 
HATCH: 
COURT: 
right, then. You'll 
submit your response, 
Thank you, your Honor. 
to the 
anyway. 
have 
Okay. Thank you, counsel. If 
, we • 11 be in recess, then. 
Could I make a motion to 
Any objection to that? 
No objection. 
All 
(Proceedings in 
were concluded.] 
right. They may be 
withdraw 
the above-entitled matter 
